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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reported at 87 
Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Ct.App. 1988) and 1988 W.L. 79881 (Utah App.) 
[West Law]. 
BASIS FOR JURISDICTION 
a. The decision to be reviewed was entered on July 26, 1988. 
b. No order respecting rehearing or granting an extension of 
time to petition for certiorari has been entered. 
c. Rule 44(c) is inapplicable. 
d. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over judgments of the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3): 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
a. United States Constitution 
Article VI § 3: . . . but no religious Test 
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any 
Office of public Trust under the United States. 
Amendment I: Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; . . . . 
b. Constitution of Utah 
Article I § 4: The rights of conscience shall 
never be infringed. The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious 
test shall be required as a qualification for 
any office of public trust or for any vote at 
any election; nor shall any person be incompe-
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tent as a witness or juror on account of reli-
gious belief or the absence thereof. . . . 
c. Statute 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3: Discrimination pro-
hibited. A citizen shall not be excluded or 
exempt from jury service on account of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin or econom-
ic status. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature and Proceedings. Plaintiff sued the owner 
and two farmers for personal injuries incurred when he dropped 
his motorcycle to avoid hitting a cow which had strayed onto a 
roadway. Judgment for the defendants was granted upon a jury 
verdict. Plaintiff appealed, alleging inter alia, that the ques-
tioning of potential jurors had been improperly limited. The 
Court of Appeals (Bench, Billings, Jackson, JJ.), reversed and 
ordered a new trial, holding that the trial court's refusal to 
question the jurors as to their membership in a defendant reli-
gious entity improperly curtailed the plaintiff's ability to 
exercise his peremptory challenges wisely even though the ques-
tions to the jury were adequate in preventing bias or prejudice. 
Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 87 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 23 (1988)["Hornsby"]; App. a. 
2. Statement of Facts. Petitioner Corporation of 
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (the "CPB") is a religious corporation sole which holds 
title to a number of Mormon or L.D.S. Church properties, includ-
ing a farm in Salt Lake County which is part of its welfare pro-
gram (the "Farm"). Petitioner Giblett managed the Farm. (R. 650, 
631; Hornsby at 23; App. a.) 
On March 30, 1983, Giblett and defendant Sutton, owner 
of adjacent farmland, attempted to move two cows that had escaped 
from the Farm to one of Sutton's pastures. Sutton backed a horse 
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trailer to the gate of his pasture, opened the gate to the trail-
er and fastened the gate to its side with baling wire and a 
hook. The two men then herded the two cows toward the trailer. 
One cow entered the trailer, but the other plunged against the 
gate, and the baling wire gave way. The cow escaped. (R. 629, 
630, 650, 673, 662, 691, 598, 658, 660, 662, 663; Hornsby at 23; 
App. a.) 
Giblett and Sutton pursued the runaway with the help of 
two boys and Sutton's daughter Mary. Mary drove her car up and 
down the area with flashing lights then pulled to the roadside to 
search on foot. After spotting the runaway, she returned to her 
car. She saw the plaintiff Hornsby approaching on his motorcycle 
and waved her arms to warn him. (R. 643, 938, 775, 561, 584, 
777, 792, 780, 782, 799, 797, 793; Hornsby at 23; App. a.) 
Plaintiff admitted seeing Mary wave but said he thought 
she was merely greeting him. After he had passed her and the 
car, he saw the cow come into the road and dropped his motorcy-
cle, sustaining injuries in the process. He sued, alleging a 
variety of claims in negligence. (R. 647, 923, 924, 798, 579; 
Hornsby at 23; App. a.) 
3. Voir Dire. At trial, the court asked potential 
jurors: 
. . . Ladies and Gentlemen, there's a couple 
of other questions I want to ask you. As 
you're all aware, one of the Defendants in 
this case is the Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-day Saints, and it's none of this Court's 
business, or anybody's business what your 
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religious preferences are. And I intend to 
ask no questions in that regard. But this is 
a civil matter; it's not a religious matter. 
It doesn't have anything to do with anybody's 
theories, or ideas, or beliefs with regard to 
religion. But I want to make sure there is 
no one on the jury who feels that they would 
have difficulty serving as a juror because of 
any strong feelings they may have one way or 
another with regard to the LDS Church. So 
let me ask the question this way: Are there 
any of you who feel that you would have trou-
ble being an impartial juror because of feel-
ings you may have either pro or con with 
regard to the L.D.S. Church that you think 
might affect your ability to be a fair and 
impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd 
like you to raise your hand. 
The record will show that all members of the 
jury have indicated that that would have no 
effect on their decision one way or the oth-
er. All parties, Ladies and Gentlemen, re-
gardless of whether they are a religion, or a 
business, or what position an individual may 
hold in the community, are entitled to equal 
justice under our system of law. And it's 
very important that all members -- parties 
receive a fair and impartial evaluation of 
their rights and responsibilities, and their 
conduct by a jury regardless of their station 
in the community. You've all indicated that 
you would do that. 
Couple other general questions, Ladies and 
Gentlemen. These are only questions that you 
can answer by looking at your own state of 
mind, and your own thoughts regarding things, 
because we can't look into your mind. But 
let me ask you this: Is there any reason 
that we have not yet discussed -- if we've 
already talked about it, obviously we don't 
need to go over it again -- is there any 
reason we have not yet discussed that you 
think might affect your ability to be a fair 
and impartial juror in this case? If so, I'd 
like you to raise your hand. The record will 
show that none of the prospective panel have 
so indicated. Let me ask the same question 
another way. Ladies and Gentlemen, if I can, 
if you were a party to this suit, if you were 
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the Plaintiff, Mr. Hornsby, or if you were 
the Defendant, the LDS Church, or Mr. Giblett 
or Mr. and Mrs. Sutton -- Mr. and Mrs. 
Sutton, if you were a party to this lawsuit, 
and knowing your own state of mind as poten-
tial jurors in this case, are there any of 
you who would be dissatisfied, or feel uncom-
fortable having a juror of your like thinking 
at the present time sitting in judgment of 
your case? In other words, would you be 
satisfied if all eight jurors that were going 
to decide your case had the same frame of 
mind about things, and the same willingness, 
or lack thereof, to follow the law on the 
facts, and decide your case. If so, I'd like 
you to raise your hand if you would have 
difficulty with a juror like yourself on your 
own jury if you were here as a party. 
(R. 1023-25; see Hornsby at 23; App. a.) 
The trial court refused to question the potential ju-
rors as to their religious affiliation, their residence in the 
religious unit (stake) in which the Farm was located or whether 
any of them held office in the Mormon Church. (R. 325-28; 
Hornsby at 23-24; App. a.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE. 
Petitioners submit that this is an important case of 
first impression. Although some courts have considered the pro-
priety of asking jurors questions about their religious affilia-
tion, research indicates no case in which a court has either held 
or been asked to hold that a juror's religious affiliation must 
be divulged in order to permit a litigant to exercise a perempto-
ry challenge on the basis of a juror's religion when the juror's 
religion does not constitute grounds for challenge for cause. 
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Petitioners submit that this novel question is of sub-
stantial importance, particularly in a state in which many citi-
zens belong to a religion and many other citizens oppose that 
religion strongly. Petitioners submit that to permit courts to 
inquire into the religious affiliation or the absence of a reli-
gious affiliation of jurors when religious doctrine is not at 
issue violates constitutional and legal principles, exalting the 
peremptory challenge (which is governed only by rule) above con-
stitutional principle and the rights of privacy of individual 
jurors. 
Petitioners further submit that the Court of Appeals 
decision, which would require such inquiry for the sole purpose 
of facilitating peremptory challenges, will create improper preju-
dice and stigma against religion and particular religions and 
will create obstacles in the selection of juries. If one party 
is permitted to argue that religious affiliation should be di-
vulged as a basis for its peremptory challenges, then the other 
should have the same right to inquire whether there are jury 
panel members who are affiliated with other religions which op-
pose the first religion or who have no religion and have views 
which oppose religion, either specific religions or religion in 
general. This line of questioning would lead to inquiry into 
doctrine and belief, improperly entangling courts into religious 
freedom and conscience. 
This Court should consider such an important issue and 
should reverse the order of the Court of Appeals. 
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II. NO COURT HAS REQUIRED THE DISCLOSURE OF RELIGIOUS 
AFFILIATION AS A QUALIFICATION FOR JURY SERVICE. 
The leading case considering the proper questioning of 
potential jurors when a religious entity is involved is Casey v. 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 
627, 72 A.L.R.2d 893 (1958) (Appendix c ) . While attending reli-
gious services, Harriet Casey had fallen on a slippery waxed 
floor at a Catholic Church, operated by the Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop of Baltimore, a religious corporation sole. She sued for 
injuries, including permanent damages resulting from broken 
wrists. 
During voir dire, Miss Casey's counsel asked the trial 
court to explain that the defendant was a corporation sole and 
owner and in possession of the church building. Plaintiff also 
asked that each member of the panel be asked: 
Does any member of the jury panel have any 
preconceived objections to, or any precon-
ceived opinions in favor of, or any bias or 
prejudice in favor of or against, a suit in 
which Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 
a corporation sole of the State of Maryland, 
is sought to be held liable in damages for 
injuries claimed to have resulted to a per-
son, a member of the Parish of the Roman 
Catholic Church in which such persons claims 
have been injured, that would prevent you 
from fairly and impartially deciding such a 
case? 
If, in your opinion, the evidence in the case 
warrants a verdict for the plaintiff, Miss 
Casey, against Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Baltimore, a corporation sole of the State of 
Maryland, the defendant, is there any member 
of the jury panel who could not fairly and 
impartially assess damages in the case in the 
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same manner as if the defendant were a regu-
lar corporation or a natural person? 
The Court declined to ask those questions but did ad-
vise the jurors that one of the parties was a religious corpora-
tion, and asked: 
Is there any reason, such as religious scru-
ples or any other reason, which would prevent 
any one of you from giving the parties a fair 
and impartial trial, finding a verdict based 
only on the law and the evidence? 
None of the panel members indicated any bias or prejudice. Judg-
ment was eventually granted to the plaintiff, but in an amount 
she contended was inadequate because of juror reluctance to make 
an award against a religion. 
In reversing the trial court, the Maryland Supreme 
Court found that the trial court's single question whether reli-
gious scruples or anything else would bias a juror was insuffi-
cient to determine a possible cause of disqualification by reason 
of bias or prejudice. The question was so general that it did 
not give adequate indication whether bias or prejudice was in 
fact being probed. 
Rather, the jurors should have been informed that the 
suit was against the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, a 
corporation sole and a religious entity, for personal injuries 
allegedly incurred by Miss Casey in her fall at the church. Then 
the court should have asked whether there was any reason why a 
juror could not arrive at a fair and impartial verdict according 
to the instructions of the court. The question to be asked and 
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the answers would disclose cause for disqualification but "would 
not necessarily have revealed the religious affiliation of the 
juror who made answer, and whether the juror was favorably or 
unfavorably disposed toward the Roman Catholic Church or toward 
an adherent of its religious faith." 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627, 
72 A.L.R.2d at 901. 
Casey thus states the principle that an inquiry into 
whether a potential juror had prejudice either for or against a 
particular religion or religious entity is valid and that preju-
dice should be determined. However, the question to be presented 
to determine the existence of any prejudice was such that no 
juror needed to disclose personal religious views in responding. 
The Maryland court thus sought to protect against prejudice but 
not to intrude into any jury panel member's beliefs or otherwise 
disclose a potential juror's religion. The Maryland court went 
no further; it did not examine the question of peremptory chal-
lenges. 
Petitioners contend that the Casey statement is ade-
quate for protecting a fair trial and that its principles were 
clearly followed, as the Appellate Court agreed, by the trial 
court in this case. See the trial court's questions at pp. 6-8, 
supra. 
Petitioners submit that to require that trial courts 
question further and that potential jurors divulge their reli-
gious views simply so that a party may assume a religious preju-
dice which is not sufficient to challenge for cause constitutes 
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an unreasonable burden upon jurors and the jury system, an issue 
which justifies review by this Court. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING JURY 
SELECTION MAKE RELIGIOUS QUESTIONING FOR PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE PURPOSES IMPROPER. 
Article I § 4 of the Constitution of Utah provides, in 
part: 
The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The State shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; no reli-
gious test shall be required as a qualifica-
tion for any office of public trust . . .; 
nor shall any person be incompetent as a wit-
ness or juror on account of religious belief 
or the absence thereof. . . . (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Constitution of the United States contains similar language: 
. . . but no religious Test shall ever be 
required as a Qualification to any Office of 
public Trust under the United States. 
U.S. Const., Art. VI § 3. 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; . . . . 
U.S. Const., Amendment I. 
These principles are codified in the Judicial Code, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-3: 
Discrimination prohibited. 
A citizen shall not be excluded or exempt 
from jury service on account of race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin or economic 
status. (Emphasis added.) 
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These clear and unequivocal statements prevent both a 
religious test for service as a juror and any form of discrimina-
tion by any governmental agency against persons on account of 
religious preference or the absence of religious preference. 
These principles are respected when, during voir dire, 
questions like those in Casey and that of the trial court are 
asked to permit challenges against jurors when any potentially 
prejudicial belief, including religious preference, might cause 
the juror to be unable to render a fair verdict on the facts and 
instructions of law to be heard at trial. The question whether a 
juror has any views, either favorable or unfavorable, solves the 
problem of bias and prejudice while protecting religious con-
science and free exercise of religion. This balance has been 
struck over the years in order to preserve the religious free 
exercise of the individual juror and to prevent any prejudice 
against a particular litigant in a criminal or civil case. 
The ruling of the Court of Appeals changes the bal-
ance. It requires courts to use their power in cases in which a 
religion is involved to compel jurors to disclose religious views 
so that peremptory challenges can be used systematically to dis-
criminate against jurors of a particular religious persuasion. 
The Court of Appeals, contrary to constitutional provisions that 
no juror can be kept from service if otherwise qualified because 
of the presence or absence of religious belief, will open the 
question of religion and membership in a particular denomination 
to public scrutiny and as a test of office. This should be pro-
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hibited. No case that Petitioners have been able to locate has 
ever gone so far. The Casey court did not. This Court has not, 
either. 
In State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), defense 
counsel should have been permitted to ask a prospective juror in 
a drunk driving case whether his abstention from drinking alcohol-
ic beverages was based on religious principles. The defendant 
had exhausted his peremptory challenges, and the failure to per-
mit the inquiry was held prejudicial error. 
In State v. Kay, 475 P.2d 541 (Utah 1970), the Mormon 
Church was the victim of the alleged wrongdoing. The defense 
attorney sought to disqualify all potential jurors who were mem-
bers of the religion, arguing that "The unfairness of a Mormon 
sitting in judgment of one charged with wrongdoing concerning his 
church and his own property seems patently clear." This Court 
rejected the sweeping indictment of a large class of citizens. 
It said: 
This quoted language appears to be an indict-
ment of every Mormon that is so unspecified 
and sweeping as to amount to what we consider 
to be an ecclesiastical non sequitur. It is 
an ipse dixit that imputes to every Mormon, 
or for that matter, every Catholic, every 
Protestant, and every Jew, ad infinitum, a 
congenital, ingrained or adopted dishonesty 
where his church's property and own property 
are involved. The leveling of such a charge 
is as unorthodox and ungracious as the charge 
itself. We cannot accept defendant's premise 
on any legal, social, economic or religious 
grounds. 
Kay, 475 P.2d at 542. A concurring opinion stated: 
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The defendant's lawyer asserts that he can 
represent the client fairly because he has 
taken an oath as a lawyer to do so. It seems 
that he refuses to ascribe to the jurors this 
same degree of moral integrity which he arro-
gates unto himself. Honesty should compel 
him to believe that each juror would be mind-
ful of his own oath to render a just and true 
verdict according to the law and the evidence. 
Kay, 475 P.2d at 543. 
The Ball and Kay rulings did not require any juror to 
disclose his religious preferences. Many religions counsel their 
members against the use of alcohol: Mormons, Seventh Day Adven-
tists, certain Methodist and Baptist denominations. The simple 
question whether a view about alcohol arose from religious teach-
ing was sufficient; the juror's religious affiliation would not 
be disclosed but the defendant would have the basis for arguing 
that the juror should be excused for cause because his religious 
views would influence his decision. A religious view which might 
constitute a prejudice against a particular class of defendants 
(in Ball, those accused of drunken driving) could properly be 
made but could also be made without religious disclosure. 
In Kay, this Court firmly guarded against the sweeping 
indictment of all members of any religion who would be accused 
because of their membership in a religion which had allegedly 
suffered an injury. Here, when the case is simple negligence, 
the trial court should not be required to obtain disclosures of 
religious affiliation upon the plaintiff's sweeping theory that 
all members of that religion would be biased against the plain-
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tiff's claim. The Court of Appeals is mandating that which was 
prohibited in Kay. 
Petitioners, submit that the Court of Appeals has over-
stepped the boundaries implied in Ball and Kay, and that its 
ruling must thus be reversed. 
IV. POTENTIAL JURORS HAVE A RIGHT TO THE PRIVACY OF THEIR VIEWS 
AND BELIEFS. 
Every citizen, whether or not called to be a member of 
a jury panel, has the rights of conscience and religious belief. 
These are private rights to each individual, guaranteed by consti-
tution and by case law. 
Becoming a member of a jury panel fulfills both an 
obligation and a privilege of citizenship. The potential juror 
is asked to lay aside regular activities to hear evidence and 
offer a verdict as a peer. These sacrifices are the only ones 
which are asked of a juror: that regular activities be laid 
aside. A call to jury duty does not require a sacrifice of the 
juror's rights to freedom of conscience and belief. To the con-
trary, the potential juror retains those rights but is asked, 
under oath, to tell whether he or she is under any prejudice, 
bias or other persuasion which would interfere with a fair ver-
dict. That is enough. Nothing more intrusive should be sanc-
tioned. 
The jury panel member's right to the privacy and integ-
rity of belief cannot so easily be laid aside as the Court of 
Appeals would have it. While the individual litigant is entitled 
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to fairness, the juror should not have his privacy intruded upon 
by being required to state his religious affiliation or prefer-
ence. The Court of Appeals has offered no consideration of the 
impact of its decision upon a particular juror or a panel of 
jurors. It has offered no insight into striking a balance be-
tween the individual rights of conscience and religious belief as 
against the right of a litigant to challenge for something other 
than cause when religious affiliation is not cause to excuse a 
juror in a negligence case like this. 
These delicate considerations of individual rights and 
conscience should be assessed by this Court upon full briefing 
and argument. 
V. RULES GOVERNING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES SHOULD NOT SUPERSEDE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. 
Peremptory challenges are governed by rule. Rule 47, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. Although both sets of rules purport to overrule any 
statute contrary to their provisions, Petitioners submit that 
there is a serious question whether these rules can or were in-
tended to overrule a statutory provision prohibiting discrimina-
tion against a juror. Clearly, such rules cannot supersede con-
stitutional prohibitions. 
The exact relationship of the peremptory challenge and 
the extent to which a panel of jurors should be questioned is a 
complex question which should be carefully briefed and argued 
before this Court. The very stating of the dimensions of the 
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problem should lead the Court to consider the issues inherent in 
the Court of Appeals' decision. 
The ruling by the Court of Appeals, which would permit 
inquiry into a juror's specific religion for the sole purpose of 
facilitating the use of a peremptory challenge (when religious 
views were not sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause), 
would permit the peremptory challenge to supersede federal and 
state constitutional principles. The implications of the Court 
of Appeals' holding thus justify review by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the importance of this first-impression case 
involving jury selection in Utah, the Petitioners CPB and Giblett 
respectfully request that this Court grant certiorari to review 
the Court of Appeals decision so that the issues may be fully 
briefed and argued before an intrusive decision is imposed upon 
trial proceedings. The Petitioners seek such other and further 
relief as may be just and proper. 
Dated: August 25, 1988 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
By / '/( %>( T\i<dU^ 
Allen M. S&fran 
M. Karlynn Hinman 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints 
and Charles Giblett 
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Appendix 
a. Opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
b. Judgment on Verdict, Memorandum 
Decision, Third Judicial District 
Court, County of Salt Lake 
c. Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 
217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627, 72 A.L.R.2d 893 (1958) 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
James Hornsby, 
Plaintiff and Appellant/ 
v. 
Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
a Utah corporation sole# 
Charles Giblett/ John Sutton# and 
John Does I through X# inclusive/ 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Bench, Billings and Jackson. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880031-CA 
F I L E D 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court o< Appeals 
BENCH/ Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of no cause of action 
entered on a special jury verdict. Because the trial court 
improperly limited voir dire of the jury panel/ we vacate the 
judgment and remand the case for a new trial. 
On March 30/ 1983/ defendants Charles 
for defendant Corporation of the Presiding 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (L.D.S 
Sutton were attempting to load into a horse 
owned by the L.D.S. Church. Approximately 
the two cows had crossed the fences separat 
property and the L.D.S. Church's welfare fa 
immediately northwest of Sutton's property, 
had agreed to delay retrieving the cows to 
Sutton's cattle. 
Giblett/ a farmer 
Bishop of the Church 
Church)/ and John 
trailer two cows 
one month earlier# 
ing Sutton's 
rm located 
Sutton and Giblett 
avoid disturbing 
On March 30, Sutton opened his corral gate and backed his 
trailer into the opening. He and Giblett then attached the 
gate to the trailer with baling wire and a hook. As the two 
men attempted to herd the cows into the trailer, one cow 
entered the trailer, but the other cow threw its weight against 
the gate, dislodging it from the trailer. The cow exited the 
corral and entered a large field owned by Kennecott 
Corporation. For the next hour, Sutton and Giblett, assisted 
by Sutton0s daughter Mary and two boys, attempted to direct the 
errant cow back onto Sutton's property. Sutton and Mary drove 
in separate vehicles with emergency lights flashing, trying to 
locate the cow. Mary parked and exited her car in a further 
attempt to locate the cow. When she spotted the cow, she 
returned to her car. 
At that moment, plaintiff James Hornsby, an employee of 
Kennecott, was driving home on his motorcycle. He noticed Mary 
waving her arms at him, but considered her waving to be a 
greeting, not a warning. Approximately 200 feet past Mary and 
her car, the cow darted out onto the road. Unable to avoid the 
cow, Hornsby laid his motorcycle down on the road and suffered 
serious injuries. 
Hornsby filed this action for damages, alleging negligence 
on the part of defendants. In response to special 
interrogatories, the jury found no negligence on the part of 
any of the defendants but determined plaintiff was negligent 
and his negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries. 
The trial court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of 
defendants. 
On appeal, Hornsby alleges the trial court erred in 
refusing to voir dire members of the jury panel concerning 
their affiliation with the L.D.S. Church. At the time of voir 
dire, Hornsby proposed the following questions, among others, 
to the trial court: 
Are any of you members of the L.D.S. 
Church? 
Would that, in any way, affect your 
ability to evaluate the evidence in this 
case and render a fair decision for the 
plaintiff? 
Did any of you hold a position in the 
L.D.S. Church such as Bishop or presiding 
officer or counselor? 
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Which stake was that in? Where is that 
located?1 
Would that position affect you in making a 
fair decision in this case? 
If the evidence were favorable to the 
plaintiff in this case, would you have a 
problem in awarding a judgment against the 
L.D.S. Church? 
The trial court rejected Hornsbyfs proposed questions, later 
explaining "it's none of this Court's business, or anybody's 
business what [jurors'] religious preferences are." The court 
then asked: 
Are there any of you who feel that you 
would have trouble being an impartial 
juror because of feelings you may have 
either pro or con with regard to the 
L.D.S. Church that you think might affect 
your ability to be a fair and impartial 
juror in this case? If so, I'd like you 
to raise your hand. 
The court stated for the record that all members of the panel 
had indicated religious feelings would have no effect on their 
decision. 
Hornsby argues the trial court erred in limiting voir d^ Lre 
regafgihg the juryHganel's reiigidixs affiliations."" The L^D.S 
CKurch contends where religious doctrine or practices are not 
at issue, it is not proper for a court to inquire as to a 
juror's religious affiliation. The scope of voir dire is a 
matter within the sound discretion of the trial j?_ourt# and its 
rulings with respect thereto "wIllTIotHbe^l^^ oh appeal 
absent a demonstrated abuse of discretion. MaItby v. Cox 
Constr. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979), cert, denied, 444 
U.S. 945 (1979). The trial court abuses its discretion when, 
"considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] 
1. A stake is a geographical unit in the L.D.S. Church. In 
his appellate brief, Hornsby also claims he should have been 
allowed to ask whether any juror attended the Oquirrh Stake 
from where the cow came, whether any of them held positions in 
that stake, and whether any of them ever volunteered at the 
subject farm or knew anyone who had or did. 
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afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information 
necessary to evaluate jurors.- State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 
448 (Utah 1988). 
Voir dire haa_as^ ,one of^ JLts purposes jfche de±Bction fiJLJbias 
suflici^CLLto challenge a rujoss^c^i^^^xixai^tox^cause . State 
v. Tavlor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). Un3er Utah R7 Civ. P. 
47(f), a prospective juror may be challenged for cause on any 
of the following grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications 
prescribed by law to render a person 
competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the 
fourth degree to either party, or to an 
officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and 
creditor, guardian and ward, master and 
servant, employer and employee or 
principal and agent, to either party, or 
united in business with either party, or 
being on any bond or obligation for either 
party; provided, that the relationship of 
debtor and creditor shall be deemed not to 
exist between a municipality and a 
resident thereof indebted to such 
municipality by reason of a tax, license 
fee, or service charge for water power, 
light or other services rendered to such 
resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having 
been a witness, on a previous trial 
between the same parties for the same 
cause of action, or being then a witness 
therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the 
juror in the result of the action, or in 
the main question involved in the action, 
except his interest as a member or citizen 
of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will 
prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging; but no 
person shall be disqualified as a juror by 
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reason of having formed or expressed an 
opinion upon the matter or cause to be 
submitted to such jury, founded upon 
public rumor, statements in public 
journals or common notoriety# if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that 
the juror can and will, notwithstanding 
such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
We believe the question asked by the trial__court wassuf f icient 
tp"~detect _^ ny_ag£uial subjectivebias ]£^^ar£ant a cK^ieii^Bz^pP 
qause under subsection (6). Because it is not necessary to 
this appeal, we do not decide whether the voir dire was 
sufficient to reveal circumstances or relationsjiips that would 
warrant^cgartlenges for cause under other subsections of RuTe "~ 
47(f). - — 
A second proper purpose for voir dire is "the collection of 
a^t-a €n pAfrTOit^ Tnformed exercise of the pe^emR!^?yiJ:haLl^nge.H 
Taylor. 664 P.2d at 447. Regarding peremptory challenges, the 
United States Supreme Court has held: 
The essential nature of the peremptory 
challenge is that it is one exercised 
without a reason stated, without inquiry 
and without being subject to the court's 
control. While challenges for cause 
permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly 
specified, provable and legally cognizable 
basis of partiality, the peremptory 
permits rejection for a real or imagined 
partiality that is less easily designated 
or demonstrable. 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citations 
omitted). A prospective juror's group affiliations is a common 
and proper topic for voir dire and ground for a peremptory 
challenge. As the Swain Court continued: 
[A peremptory challenge] is often 
exercised . . . upon a juror's "habits and 
associations" . . . . It is no less 
frequently exercised on grounds normally 
thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or 
official action, namely, the race, 
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religion, nationality, occupation or 
affiliations of people summoned for jury 
duty, 
I&. (quoting Haves v. Missouri. 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)) 
(emphasis added). 
The issue of religion as a topic for voir dire was 
addressed in State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984). In 
Ball, defendant was charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol. During voir dire, the trial court asked the jury 
panel whether any of them had prejudices against people that 
drink. None indicated they did. Defendant then asked if any 
of them chose not to drink for any reason. Four jurors 
responded they did not drink. Defendant then proposed to the 
trial court to ask if those jurors' choice not to drink was for 
a personal or a religious conviction. The trial court, 
concerned with constitutional protections, denied defendant's 
request. Defendant was able to eliminate three of the four 
non-drinking jurors by exercising all of his peremptory 
challenges, but the fourth sat on the jury which convicted 
him. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held defendant's question 
as to the four jurors' reasons for their non-use of alcohol 
should have been allowed. The Court acknowledged the "extreme 
deference afforded in Swain to the unfettered exercise of 
[peremptory] challenges,H and stated as follows: 
Religious beliefs, unlike gender or race, 
are not readily apparent, and their 
existence, if directly related to the 
subject matter of the suit . . . must be 
determined by preliminary inquiry. . . . 
Voir dire is intended to provide a tool 
for counsel and the court to carefully and 
skillfully determine, by inquiry, whether 
biases and prejudices, latent as well as 
acknowledged, will interfere with a fair 
trial if a particular juror serves in it. 
Id. at 1057, 1058. ^ p ^ 
Both Swain and Bal l r ecogn ize t j ^ r e a re ca se s where 
r e l i g i o n and group a f f i l i a t i o n ^ ^ j & g ^ ^ p r o p r i a t e t o p i c s for v o i r 
d i r e . In t he i n s t a n t casei^aeFend¥n$: d id not propose t o 
q u e s t i o n t h e p r o s p e c t i v e jurOTS^^nTto t h e i r s p e c i f i c 
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beliefs.2 JRa%hor^<^s the L.D.S> Church was one of th^ e 
parties /(^efendant^merelv proposed to question J:he _jurors 
^egarding^ttrgg^ffilij^oj^jwitirthe L.p.S. Church. Whenever a 
y^i^i^ut' orgfaniz^ion is a party to the litigation, voir dire' 
regarding the jury panelfs religious affiliations is proper. 
State vT"Via. i4b^Sxrz7^ToF, 704 P.2d 238~7l985); Coleman v. 
United States, 379 A.2d 951 (D.C. 1977); Casev v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore. 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 
(1958). 
Substantial impairment of the right to informed exercise of 
peremptory challenges_is_reversibXe, error. Swain, 380 U.S. at 
119: Ball" 685 P72d at 10667 In the instant case, the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying voir dire^regarding Jbhe 
prospective jurors^Mjy.liation with the LJ.DJJL^ Church. The 
scope of voir^grrre^shouTd be sufficiently broad to allow the 
pai^tTi^^ to exercise their peremptory challenges. 
Irr¥o^holding# W<ET do not require the trial^ co'urtT tcT propound 
tfte precise guejtjLons proposed by Hornsby^ Rather, we leave 
intactthe consTderable discretion afforded^to trial^ourtsCto 
contain voir ITire^wTEhin fegisonaBT^Timits. See Ball, 685 P.2d 
at 1060 (trial court has a duty to protect juror privacy); 
People v. Williams. 29 Cal.3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 
317 (1981) (trial court should not permit inordinately 
extensive and unfocused questioning). The judgment in favor of 
defendants is vacated and the case is remanded for a new 
trial.3 
In light of our decision to remand for a new trial, it is 
not necessary to discuss Hornsby's other alleged errors. 
However, since the trial court may be faced with the same 
issues on remand, we make the following observations. See 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986). 
2. The religious beliefs of the prospective jurors are not 
directly related to the subject matter of this suit, and hence 
could not properly be examined during voir dire. 
3. Defendants John and Mary Sutton argue any potential 
prejudice in favor of the L.D.S. Church caused by the trial 
court's error did not affect the jury's finding as to their 
lack of negligence. However, in view of the overlapping nature 
of the possible liabilities, justice requires a new trial as to 
all defendants. See Kord's Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. White. 14 
Ariz. App. 294, 482 P.2d 903 (1971). 
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Hornsby argues defendants' use of the term "welfare" when 
referring to the farm owned by the L.D.S. Church improperly 
biased the jury in their favor and was in violation of a court 
order. We fail to find any merit in Hornsby's contention. The 
subject property is commonly referred to as a welfare farm. 
Hornsby offers no evidence of improper bias other than mere 
speculation. Furthermore/ Hornsby fails to cite to any record 
evidence of a court order regarding the use of the term 
"welfare." 
Hornsby also argues the trial court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur/ negligence per se, and 
strict liability. "A party is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theories of the case and points of law 
provided competent evidence is presented to support them." 
Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433/ 435 (Utah App. 1987). We 
will reverse a trial court's judgment for failure to give a 
requested instruction only if the jury is prejudicially misled 
or insufficiently or erroneously advised on the law. Jjl. 
To warrant a res ipsa loquitur instruction, a plaintiff 
must show: 1) the accident was one which ordinarily does not 
happen but for someone's negligence; 2) plaintiff's own use or 
operation of the agency or instrumentality was not primarily 
responsible for the injury; and 3) the agency or 
instrumentality causing the injury was within defendant's 
exclusive control and management. Rovlance v. Rowe, 737 P.2d 
232/ 235 (Utah App. 1987). Hornsby claims the evidence in the 
instant case establishes the three required elements for a res 
ipsa loquitur instruction. However/ application of res ipsa 
loquitur presupposes a plaintiff's inability to point to the 
specific allegedly negligent act which caused the injury. Kusv 
v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1984). If 
the "evidence in the case reveals all of the facts and 
circumstances of the occurrence and clearly establishes the 
precise allegedly negligent act which is the cause of 
plaintiff's injury," then res ipsa loquitur is not applicable. 
Roylance, 737 P.2d at 235. 
In the instant case, the evidence presented at trial 
described and established the act committed by Giblett and 
Sutton which Hornsby alleges to be negligent. Defendants 
backed the horse trailer into the corral gate opening. They 
then attached the rear doors of the trailer to the gate with 
baling wire. As they attempted to load the cows into the 
trailer, one of the cows threw its weight against the gate# 
dislodging it from the trailer. The cow escaped through the 
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opening. As the allegedly negligent act was clear from the 
evidence, res ipsa loquitur was not applicable. 
The trial court also refused Hornsby's requested 
instruction on negligence per se. Violation of a statute or 
ordinance is negligence per se. Joraensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80 
(Utah App. 1987). Hornsby argues defendants violated Salt Lake 
County Ordinances § 10-10-3 (1966) (now § 14.20.050 (1986)), 
which states: 
Every person staking, tethering, herding, 
grazing or pasturing, or allowing to run 
at large or causing to be staked, 
tethered, herded, grazed or pastured, or 
allowed to run at large, any horse, cow, 
mule, sheep, goat or swine, or other 
animal upon any of the public highways of 
the county shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
Defendants1 conduct was not in violation of section 10-10-3. 
They were not staking, tethering, herding, grazing, or 
pasturing the errant cow under the common definitions of those 
terms. Nor did defendants "allow" the cow to run at large. 
See Santanello v. Cooper. 106 Ariz. 262, 475 P.2d 246 (1970) 
(••allow" means to sanction, permit, acknowledge, approve of). 
In any event, section 10-10-3 must be construed in light of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38(3) (1987), which states: 
In any civil action brought by the owner, 
operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle 
. . . for damages caused by collision with 
any domestic animal or animals on a 
highway, there is no presumption that the 
collision was due to negligence on behalf 
of the owner or the person in possession 
of livestock. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1987) provides: 
The provisions of this chapter are 
applicable and uniform throughout this 
state and in all of its political 
subdivisions and municipalities. A local 
authority may not enact or enforce any 
rule or ordinance in conflict with the 
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provisions of this chapter. Local 
authorities may, however, adopt ordinances 
consistent with this chapter, and 
additional traffic ordinances which are 
not in conflict with this chapter. 
The trial court's refusal of Hornsby's requested negligence per 
se instruction was correct. 
Finally, Hornsby contends the court erred in refusing to 
instruct the jury on strict liability. Hornsby claims the cow 
had a dangerous or vicious tendency known to defendants. 
Nothing in the record supports his assertion. The court's 
refusal to give the instruction was therefore justified. 
fZuUL M i^^C 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Norman H. Jackson, 
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Allen M. Swan, A3165 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES N. HORNSBY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a 
Utah corporation sole, CHARLES 
GIBLETT, JOHN SUTTON AND MARY 
LEE SUTTON, and DOES I through 
X, Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge, commencing 
Tuesday the 29th day of October, 1985 and continuing through 
Friday the 1st day of November, 1985, Laura L. Boyer appearing 
for plaintiff, Allen M, Swan of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
appearing for defendants Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 
of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and Charles 
Giblett and Stephen G, Morgan of Morgan, Scalley & Reading 
appearing for defendants John Sutton and Mary Lee Sutton 
and testimony having been adduced and argument of counsel 
F.' "."? '"} CL'":^ "^  CFFJ^r 
NOV 1 L i?3; 
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT 
Civil No. *€-9-5^ 5Trr3-
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
C $ 3 - S&I9 
heard and the matter having been submitted to the jury on 
a Special Verdict and the jury having returned its Special 
Verdict finding that the plaintiff, James Hornsby, was negligent 
and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident 
and finding that none of the defendants were negligent, now 
therefore it is hereby 
ORDERED that judgment enter on the verdict in favor 
of each of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause 
of action together with defendants1 costs incurred herein 
yv Stf De-TfKMtdeo t//>o^ /*/(.///£ o^ /^ ASS**/*/*?*? in the sum of $ m^71s*0/<-*1^J <J C 
DATED this /r day of November, 1385 
BY THE COlliRT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON BtNDLSY / w \ 
oy
 **~~ ' nfioutvClefk / D i s t r i c t J 
&A? C<0£-7£ — 7>p4 
iH^ Served by mailing copies this 4r day of November, 
1985, to Laura L. Boyer, 3167 West 4700 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84118 and to Stephen G. Morgan, 261 East 300 South, 
2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
/^ V&>L yy\yAuy»~ 
A l l e n M. Swan 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES HORNSBY and 
NANETTE MAILY HORNSBY, his wife,
 # MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, CIVIL NO. C-83-5019 
vs • 
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS : 
CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, 
a Utah corporation, sole, et al.,# 
Defendants • : 
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the part of the 
defendants asking the Court to dismiss the claims for loss of 
consortium, together with the defendant Church and Giblett's Motion 
in Limine seeking to restrict evidence regarding an earlier 
alleged negligent act came before the Court for hearing, together 
with all parties Motion to Continue the Trial Date, and plaintiffs1 
Motion to Amend. The Court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their 
Complaint to set forth additional claims of negligence, and to join 
an additional party defendant* The Court after discussion with 
counsel also agreed to strike the trial date currently scheduled 
for August 28, 1984, and continue this matter without trial date 
until such time as one of the parties at their option files a 
supplemental Certification of Readiness for Trial. The Court 
granted the defendants' Motion regarding the plaintiffs* claims for 
loss of consortium, and took the question of defendants1 Motion in 
Limine under advisement for further consideration. 
Upon reviewing the file and considering carefully the issues 
of proximate cause, independent intervening proximate cause, and 
foreseeablility, the Court declines at this point in time to 
grant the defendants' Motion in Limine restricting evidence that may 
pertain to alleged negligent conduct on the part of the defendant 
Church regarding its fences approximately a month prior to the date 
the animal in question escaped. The Court is unable to rule as a 
matter of law at the present time regarding the question of proximate 
cause and foreseeability, keeping in mind that such issues are 
normally reserved for a jury in cases of negligence such as the one 
before the Court, 
Counsel for the plaintiffs is to prepare an Order setting forth 
the Court's decision as contained in this Memorandum Decision 
dealing with plaintiffs1 Motion to Amend, the continuance of the 
trial date, and the defendants' Motion in Limine- Counsel for the 
defendant Church is requested to prepare anydrder setting forth the 
Court's ruling dismissing the plaintiffs/ claim for loss of consortium. 
Dated this / p day of July, 1/84 A + 
TlMtfTHY^R. HANSON 
D I S T R I C T COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H DiXON HlNDttV 
^ je^—i • — D s p u t y c i « * 
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In the case before us the landowner lived 
in the property before the tax sale and has 
continuously remained in possession for 
over seven years since the tax sale. I 
think that Sec. 17 of Art. 57 was not re-
pealed by the tax sales law of 1943 and 
that it entitled the landowner to the relief 
he sought in his bill to quiet title. As I 
read the section, it applies only to those 
who seek to enter and not to those already 
in possession. There would seem to be no 
necessity, under the statute, to apply the 
period of limitations to one already in pos-
session, who seeks no more than a declara-
tion of his right to remain in possession. 
The decision of the majority was that the 
court lacked jurisdiction in the proceed-
ings to foreclose the right of redemption 
because the description of the property 
used in the tax sale and in the foreclosure 
proceedings was inadequate and irregular. 
The heart of the majority opinion is found 
in the sentence: "No policy in favor of 
protecting tax titles acquired through pro-
ceedings in rein can make a description 
which describes land as situated in one part 
of a county adequate to describe land situ-
ated in another." The property was de-
scribed as owned by Henry Granville 
Thomas, Jr., and as consisting of " 9 ^ ac 
& Imps, Sweepstakes", located in the 4th 
Election District of Montgomery County. 
The property is actually situated in the 
10th Election District. The mistake in the 
election district sounds more serious when 
described arithmetically than it actually is, 
geographically, since the 4th and 10th Elec-
tion Districts of Montgomery County are 
contiguous, and the land is in the same part 
of the county as the description indicates 
it to be. A description in a tax sale has two 
purposes—to warn the owner and to attract 
buyers. Josenhans, Inc., v. Jenkins, 203 
Md. 465, 472, 102 A.2d 257, 43 A.L.R.2d 
961. The description we are concerned 
with might have been inadequate to notify 
prospective purchasers of the location of 
the property and, so, insufficient to support 
a tax sale that was duly attacked prior to 
the decree foreclosing the right of redemp-
tion. However, if the owner had read the 
description either in the advertisement of 
the tax sale or in the notice by publication 
in the foreclosure proceedings, he would 
instantly have known that his property was 
being referred to. This fact makes it plain 
that the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County had jurisdiction. Although the 
proceeding is in rem and he need not have 
been, the landowner was a resident, the 
land is in the county, and the advertise-
ment could not have failed to warn the 
landowner H. Granville Thomas that his 
9}i acres in Montgomery County, known 
as Sweepstakes, was being dealt with. In 
determining the validity of the proceed-
ings to foreclose only the effect of the de-
scription on the owner need be considered. 
The Tax Sales Act of 1943 sought to 
make tax sales immune from attacks not 
asserted in the proceedings to foreclose 
the right of redemption other than lack of 
jurisdiction or fraud in that proceeding. 
Since the passage of the Act, this Court has 
faithfully protected its purpose. As a re-
sult, the intent of the Act to make tax sales 
titles valid and marketable has been effect-
uated. The majority opinion cannot fail 
seriously to weaken, if not to destroy, the 
legislative purpose and the prior holdings 
of this Court in carrying out that purpose 
in Thomas v. Kolker, 195 Md. 470, 73 A.2d 
886; Oppenheimer v. Micbar Co., 192 Md. 
192, 63 A.2d 765; Shapiro v. National Color 
Printing Co., 191 Md. 194, 60 A.2d 679; 
Gathwright v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore, 181 Md. 362, 30 A.2d 252, 145 
A.L.R. 590; James v. Zantzinger, 202 Md. 
109, 96 A.2d 10, and Sanchez v. James, 209 
Md. 266, 120 A.2d 836. Never before have 
prior irregularities been allowed to effect 
a foreclosure decree or to serve as the 
basis of a finding of lack of jurisdiction. 
Now I fear, tax titles have again been 
made doubtful and litigation as to them in-
vited by unnecessarily—and I think errone-
ously—basing the decision on a very un-
settling ground when the same result prop-
erly could have been reached on another 
ground. 
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Harriet M. CASEY 
v. 
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF 
BALTIMORE. 
No. 299. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
July 19, 1958. 
Dissenting Opinion July 28, 1958. 
Action by parishioner against a reli-
gious corporation for personal injuries sus-
tained on a waxed floor. Judgment for 
plaintiff for $2,500 and plaintiff appealed 
from the judgment in the Superior Court 
of Baltimore County, Emory H. Niles, 
Chief Judge, on the ground that the award 
was inadequate and the corporation filed 
a cross appeal. The Court of Appeals, Hor-
ney, J., held that evidence of negligence and 
contributory negligence was for the jury, 
that the voir dire examination of prospec-
tive jurors was inadequate, that part of a 
pretrial statement was improperly deleted, 
and that instructions on damages were suf-
ficient. 
Judgment reversed and cause remanded 
for a new trial. 
Hammond, J., dissented. 
1. Religious Societies <§=>3l(6) 
In action for injuries sustained by 
parishioner who slipped and fell on waxed 
floor of a church building, evidence of neg-
ligence and contributory negligence was 
properly submitted to the jury. 
2. Jury <S=3l3l(2) 
The scope of questions propounded to 
jurors on their voir dire is largely in the 
discretion of the trial court. 
3. Appeal and Error <^I045(I) 
Jury <®=5l3l(l) 
Parties to an action triable before a 
jury have a right to have questions pro-
pounded to prospective jurors on their voir 
dire which are directed to a specific cause 
for disqualification and the failure to al-
low such questions is an abuse of discre-
tion constituting reversible error. 
4. Jury «©=>131(6) 
In action against a Roman Catholic 
Archbishop, a corporation, for injuries sus-
tained by a parishioner, question asked 
prospective jurors which was in the form 
so general that it did not sufficiently indi-
cate to the panel what possible bias or prej-
udice was being probed, was insufficient 
and the court should have informed the 
prospective jurors that the suit was against 
the Roman Catholic Archbishop, the cor-
poration, that the suit was against the cor-
poration only, that it was not a suit against 
the Archbishop personally. 
5. Jury <S=3l3l(6) 
In action against a religious corpora-
tion, if the religious affiliation of a pros-
pective juror might reasonably prevent him 
from arriving at an impartial verdict, the 
parties were entitled to ferret out, or have 
the court discover for them, the existence 
of bias or prejudice resulting from such 
affiliation. 
6. Jury <§=>97(l) 
A party is entitled to a jury free of 
all disqualifying bias or prejudice and not 
merely a jury free of bias or prejudice of 
a general or abstract nature. 
7. Trial <S=>9(I) 
On issue of whether it is proper to de-
lete a reference in a pretrial statement to 
insurance, the deletion is usually preferred 
in order to avoid the possible prejudicial 
effect, that reference to insurance might 
have on a jury if the word was not deleted. 
8. Trial <§=>I27 
When the reference to insurance is 
made by the defendant, he cannot move for 
a mistrial. 
9. Trial <§=M27 
In action by a parishioner against a 
religious corporation for injuries where 
witness had made a signed statement stat-
ing that the parishioner "said she hoped the 
insurance on the Church was paid up" and 
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the priest made a remark about not worry-
ing about it, where defendant sought to 
introduce the statement without reference 
to the quoted phrase to impeach the witness, 
and the deletion materially changed the 
meaning of what the witness had said in 
the statement as to relevant facts, defendant 
was required to choose between introducing 
the whole statement without alteration or 
none of it, and where the deletion would 
produce a substantial alteration of the 
meaning of the phrase in which the refer-
ence to insurance was used, the exclusion 
should not have been permitted. 
10. Appeal and Error <S=»215<I) 
Where appellant failed to object to an 
amended instruction, the Court of Appeals 
was without jurisdiction to consider her 
contentions with respect thereto. Maryland 
Rules, rule 554 and subd. d. 
11. Trial ©=5228(1) 
The Court of Appeals cannot put the 
trial judge in a strait jacket and prescribe 
or adopt a formula to be used and followed 
by him with respect to his instructions to 
the jury. 
12. Trial <§=232(l) 
Instructions are sufficient if the ques-
tion or point of law involved is fully and 
comprehensively covered. 
13. Damages <S=2fO(l) 
In action for personal injuries, origi-
nal and amended instructions contained a 
fair statement of the law with respect to 
damages with respect to plaintiff's conten-
tion that they omitted any mention of her 
inability to do her household duties and 
that she was denied any recovery for her 
crippled condition. 
Paul Berman and Melvin J. Sykes, Bal-
timore (Sigmund Levin and Theodore B. 
Berman, Baltimore, on the brief), for ap-
pellant. 
J. Gilbert Prendergast and George E. 
dergast, Baltimore, on the brief), for ap-
pellee. 
Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDER-
SON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and 
HORNEY, JJ. 
HORNEY, Judge. 
Harriet M. Casey, plaintiff-appellant and 
cross-appellee (the plaintiff), brought suit 
in the Superior Court of Baltimore City 
against Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bal-
timore, a corporation sole of the State of 
Maryland (corporation sole or defendant), 
as the holder of the legal title to St. Pat-
rick's Roman Catholic Church of Havre de 
Grace, for damages arising out of person-
al injuries she sustained when she slipped 
and fell on the waxed floor of the church 
building. The jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff for $2,500, but, claim-
ing that the award was inadequate, she ap-
pealed alleging errors in the examination of 
the jurors on their voir dire, in a ruling 
on the evidence, and in the instructions of 
the court with respect to damages. The 
right of the plaintiff to appeal from a judg-
ment in her favor is not disputed. The 
corporation sole filed a cross-appeal on the 
ground that there was insufficient evidence 
of negligence for the case to go to the jury. 
In the afternoon of Saturday, October 
2, 1954, before the plaintiff arrived, two 
workmen or sextons had cleaned and waxed 
the floors inside the church. At least three-
fourths of the center aisle had been waxed 
with a liquid spread by an ordinary domes-
tic rag mop made of twisted strings. No 
buffer was used because it was too late in 
the afternoon and the sextons thought it 
would be "better to leave the wax on and 
let the people work it out themselves," that 
is, by walking on it. Although there was 
no unanimity as to the condition of the 
weather, it appears that it was not con-
ducive to quick drying. The church was not 
well lighted, and one witness testified that 
the center aisle was the darkest part of the 
church. The church had stained glass win-
CASEY 7. ROMAN CATHOLIC AECHBISHOP OF BALTIMORE Md. 629 
Cite as 143 AJ2d 627 
no artificial lighting in the main body of 
the church at the time of the accident. 
The plaintiff, an elderly maiden lady and 
a member of St. Patrick's Parish, arrived 
at the church at about 5 o'clock, entered 
the main door, which was at the far end of 
the church from the altar, walked down 
the center aisle to the second pew from the 
main door, and prayed prior to making her 
confession. Her ante-confession prayers 
-completed, she turned toward the main door, 
^proceeded to the confessional booth im-
mediately to the right of the center aisle 
from the main entrance, and remained there 
until about ten after five. Then, as was her 
custom, and in fact the usual custom for 
all parishioners, she walked up the center 
aisle toward the altar to complete her pray-
ers. She did not notice that the floor was 
slippery until she slipped and fell at a point 
slightly over halfway to the altar rail. 
When her feet slipped from under her, she 
fell backwards. She tried to break the fall 
with her hands and in so doing broke bones 
in both wrists, and the back of her head 
struck the tile floor. A sergeant in the Air 
Force interrupted his prayers to aid the 
plaintiff, and when he approached the place 
where she was lying, he too slipped but 
•managed to check a fall. He then observed 
-a translucent fluid in the middle of the aisle 
which appeared to be wax. There was 
other testimony that there were wet spots 
which were "dangerously slippery" due to 
the wax on the floor. Another parishioner 
had also slipped a few minutes before the 
plaintiff but she did not fall. Although the 
evidence was conflicting, there was also 
testimony that there were no barriers across 
the center aisle to give warning of the pos-
sibly dangerous condition. No verbal warn-
ing of the slippery condition was given to 
the plaintiff, although at least one other 
parishioner was so warned. 
Father Monmonier, the parish priest, was 
called and, according to the sextons, he 
tested the floor by trying to "skate" up the 
aisle on the waxed surface to ascertain how 
slippery the floor was. He "skated" from 
_ 1 xi i_:_i.:.cr i . . : 1 „ , „ . . „*«,-*_ 
ped only by the altar rail. As a result of the 
test, he gave orders to the sextons to re-
move the wax immediately and to mop the 
center aisle with clear warm water, which 
was promptly done. 
After the accident the plaintiff was taken 
to the hospital where she remained for 
three weeks. For three weeks after her 
discharge, a nurse and a maid took care of 
her. But the effects of her injuries per-
sisted. It was estimated that she had a 
permanent disability of between thirty-five 
and fifty per centum, and a loss of func-
tioning in both hands and both arms. 
We shall consider the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence as to negligence 
first, and then the errors alleged by the 
plaintiff. 
(i). Negligence. 
[1] Since there was legally sufficient 
evidence to entitle the plaintiff to recover, 
the trial court was correct in submitting the 
issues of negligence and contributory neg-
ligence to the jury. In Isaac Benesch & 
Sons v. Ferkler, 1927, 153 Md. 680, 139 A. 
557, recovery was permitted against a de-
partment store by a customer who testified 
that the floor on which she fell was " 'dark 
and mucky and smeary, like an oiled floor 
would be when the oil was not dried,' " 
and that the oily condition of the floor was 
"what caused her to fall." We upheld the 
propriety of submitting the case to the jury 
by saying, 153 Md. at page 684, 139 A. at 
page 559: 
"These were facts from which the 
jury might conclude that the appellant 
[defendant] had been negligent. It 
was not the mere fact that the floor 
was oiled and the appellee [plaintiff] 
fell that entitled her to recover; it was 
the condition in which the floor was 
left as a result of the oiling that was 
submitted to the jury, * * *." 
In the case now before us there was 
amplr evidence of the condition in which 
the 1 . had been left. The wax had been 
poured on and spread only with a rag mop, 
and had not been buffed. No effort had 
J3Q Md. 143 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
with a uniform smoothness. That task was 
left to "the people" by walking on i t As a 
result wet spots remained in the middle of 
he aisle which were "dangerously slippery." 
Dne such spot was within two paces from 
where the plaintiff fell. Other persons had 
slipped on the floor both before and after 
he plaintiff had fallen. Immediately after 
he accident the parish priest was able to 
.lide or "skate" up the aisle about thirteen 
'eet to the alter rail, whereupon he ordered 
he wax removed. One of the sextons had 
varned another parishioner, but he had not 
varned the plaintiff of the slippery condi-
ion. Under these circumstances, it can-
lot be said that there was no evidence of 
legligence. See Prosser, Torts (2d ed. 
955) § 78. Furthermore, whether the 
)laintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence in failing to be on the lookout for a 
vaxed floor or in not observing the slippery 
•ondition of the floor was also a question 
)f fact for the jury, and not a question of 
aw for the trial court to decide in this 
ase. Isaac Benesch & Sons v. Ferkler, 
upra. 
(ii). Voir Dire Examination. 
Before the trial began the plaintiff re-
vested the court to inform the jury that 
he defendant was a corporation sole and 
is such was the "owner and * * * in 
>ossession and control" of the church 
luilding, and to propound the following 
[uestions to the panel of jurors on their 
'oir dire: 
"(1) Does any member of the jury 
panel have any preconceived objections 
to, or any preconceived opinions in 
favor of, or any bias or prejudice in 
favor of or against, a suit in which 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Balti-
more, a corporation sole of the State 
of Maryland, is sought to be held liable 
in damages for injuries claimed to 
have resulted to a person, a member of 
the Parish of the Roman Catholic 
Church in which such person claims to 
have been injured, that would prevent 
you from fairly and impartially decid-
ing such a case?" 
"(2) If, in your opinion, the evi-
dence in the case warrants a verdict 
for the plaintiff, Miss Casey, against 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Balti-
more, a corporation sole of the State of 
Maryland, the defendant, is there any 
member of the jury panel who could 
not fairly and impartially assess dam-
ages in the case in the same manner as 
if the defendant were a regular corpo-
ration or a natural person?" 
The court declined to inform the jury or 
to ask the questions as requested. There is 
a difference of opinion as to whether the 
jurors heard the clerk recite the title of the 
case when it was called for trial. In any 
event, the trial court, after informing the 
jurors that one of the parties was a "re-
ligious corporation," propounded the fol-
lowing question: 
"Is there any reason, such as reli-
gious scruples or any other reason, 
which would prevent any one of you 
from giving the parties a fair and im-
partial trial, finding a verdict based 
only on the law and the evidence?" 
None of the panel indicated that he had any 
bias or prejudice, when interrogated on his 
voir dire. It is possible, of course, that the 
jurors may have heard the titling of the 
case when they were sworn to try the is-
sues, but there is nothing to indicate wheth-
er they did or not. However, the record 
does not disclose that any juror informed 
the court at that time of his disqualification. 
The rule with respect to the bias or prej-
udice of a juror in certain cases is sta* ! in 
31 Am.Jur., Jury, § 183, in this manner: 
"A general, abstract bias or preju-
dice which a juror may entertain to a 
class of litigation will not of itself dis-
qualify him from trying a cause, when 
it appears that he can set that feeling 
aside and can and will fairly and im-
partially decide the particular case 
solely upon the evidence and the in-
structions of the court; however, 
where such bias or prejudice is a fixed 
and abiding one * * * he is dis-
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qualified as a juror with respect to an 
action falling in such class." 
[2, 3] In this State it is well settled that 
the scope of the questions propounded to 
jurors on their voir dire is largely in the 
discretion of the trial court. Of course, the 
only purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain 
the existence of cause for disqualification. 
Grossfeld v. Braverman, 1954, 203 Md. 498, 
101 A.2d 824. See also Adams v. State, 
1952, 200 Md. 133, 88 A.2d 556. However, 
it is also well settled that parties to an ac-
tion triable before a jury have a right to 
liave questions propounded to prospective 
jurors on their voir dire, which are directed 
to a specific cause for disqualification, and 
failure to allow such questions is an abuse 
of discretion constituting reversible error. 
Alexander v. R. D. Grier & Sons Co., 1943, 
181 Md. 415, 30 A.2d 757; Cohen v. State, 
1937, 173 Md. 216, 195 A. 532, 196 A. 819; 
Beck v. State, 1926, 151 Md. 615, 135 A. 
410; Whittemore v. State, 1926, 151 Md. 
309, 134 A. 322. With respect to the man-
ner in which the trial judge should exercise 
his discretion we said in Bryant v. State, 
1955, 207 Md. 565, at page 583, 115 AJ2d 
502, at page 510: 
"In the exercise of * * * dis-
cretion, the trial judge should adapt the 
questions to the needs of each case in 
the effort to secure an impartial jury. 
Any circumstances that may reason-
ably be regarded as rendering a person 
unfitted for jury service may be made 
the subject of questions and a chal-
lenge for cause. Accordingly an ex-
amination of a juror on his voir dire is 
proper as long as it is conducted within 
the right to discover the juror's state 
of mind in respect to the matter in 
hand or any collateral matter reason-
ably liable to unduly influence him." 
[4] The trial court ruled that the ques-
tions submitted by the plaintiff would not 
be asked because the effect, if not the in-
tent, was to inquire into the jurors' reli-
gious affiliations, which the court thought 
would be improper. We do not say, or 
even intend to intimate, that the court was 
required to propound the precise questions 
submitted. The form of the questions to be 
asked is clearly within the sound discretion 
of the court. However, it is clear that the 
only question propounded by the court was 
not sufficient to determine possible cause 
for disqualification by reason of bias or 
prejudice or otherwise. The question 
asked was in a form so general that it is 
likely it did not sufficiently indicate to the 
panel of jurors what possible bias or preju-
dice was being probed. To ask the jurors 
whether they would be prevented from ren-
dering a fair and impartial verdict by the 
fact that a party was a "religious corpora-
tion"—which they might not even realize 
meant a church—without informing them 
of the church involved or the position of 
the religious corporation in the suit would 
defeat the whole purpose of questioning 
jurors on their voir dire. We think there 
is no doubt that the court should have in-
formed the prospective jurors that the ac-
tion was a suit by Harriet M. Casey 
against Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Baltimore, a corporation sole, for personal 
injuries allegedly arising out of an accident 
which occurred in St. Patrick's Church at 
Havre de Grace. ^ n-October 2, 1954; that 
the suit was against the corporation only, 
as the holder of the legal title to the church 
building; and that it was not a suit against 
the Archbishop of Baltimore personally nor 
against him in his ecclesiastical capacity as 
such Archbishop. Then, the court should 
have propounded a question inquiring if 
there was any reason why any juror could 
not arrive at a fair and impartial verdict 
based on the evidence to be produced and 
the law applicable to the case to be set forth 
in the instructions of the court, or words to 
that effect. If the court had deemed it 
necessary, it could have continued to exam-
ine the jurors, or any one of them, in the 
manner suggested in Bryant v. State, supra. 
By so doing, the nature of the answer, if it 
disclosed cause for disqualification, would 
not necessarily have revealed the religious 
affiliation of the juror who made answer, 
and whether the juror was favorably or un-
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favorably disposed toward the Roman 
Catholic Church or toward an adherent to 
its religious faith. 
[5, 6] Beyond this, however, even if the 
trial court was correct in its characteriza-
tion of the question it propounded, the law 
is clear that, if the religious affiliation of a 
juror might reasonably prevent him from 
at living at a fair and impartial verdict in a 
particular case because of the nature of the 
case, the parties are entitled to ferret out, or 
pieferably have the court discover for 
them, the existence of bias or prejudice re-
sulting from such affiliation. In other 
words, a party is entitled to a jury free of 
all disqualifying bias or prejudice without 
exception, and not merely a jury free of 
bias or prejudice of a general or abstract 
nature. Cf. Adams v. State, supra. And 
jee Miles v. United States, 1881, 103 U.S. 
504, 26 L.Ed. 481 [jurors asked if they be-
ieved in the truth of Mormon teachings] ; 
^eople v. Reyes, 1855, 5 Cal. 347 [conviction 
)f Mexican Roman Catholic reversed be-
cause trial court refused to inquire if pro-
jective jurors were members of the Know 
Nothing Party and had taken a secret ob-
igation under which they could not possibly 
lave given a Roman Catholic a fair and im-
>artial trial] ; Smith v. Smith, 1935, 7 Cal. 
\pp.2d 271, 46 P.2d 232 [jurors asked if 
heir religious belief in regard to divorce 
md remarriage might affect the verdict]. 
Jee also Cleage v. Hyden, 1871, 53 Tenn. 
r3. We hold that the examination of the 
>rospective jurors on their voir dire in this 
ase was not sufficiently comprehensive to 
Lssure the selection of a fair and impartial 
ury. 
(Hi) Deletion of Part of Pre-trial 
Statement. 
[7] Prior to the trial of this case, the 
ilaintiff's witness, Sergeant Leo M. Moore, 
r., had made a signed statement in which 
le had said, among other things: "Mrs. 
Jrown, after noting the floor was slippery, 
aid she hoped the insurance on the church 
•>as paid up. Father made a remark about 
added indicates the parts deleted). During 
the course of the trial, the defendant, desir-
ing to use the statement to impeach the 
credibility of the witness, applied to the 
court for permission, which was granted 
over the objection of the plaintiff, to delete 
certain words (above emphasized), particu-
larly the reference to the word "insurance," 
and to insert certain other words. After 
the deletion and insertion had been made 
the two sentences referred to read: "Mrs. 
Brown made a remark that the floor was 
slippery. Father made a remark about not 
worrying about it." (The emphasis added 
indicates the part inserted). The witness, 
when testifying on direct examination, had 
made no mention of insurance. It might be 
argued that the deletion favored the plain-
tiff in that the altered statement indicated 
that the priest had indirectly admitted lia-
bility, and that she need not worry about 
compensation for her injuries. However,, 
the plaintiff, among other assigned reasons,, 
insists that the alteration of the grammati-
cal structure of the first sentence materially 
changed the meaning of what the witness 
had said in a part of the statement which 
not only referred to insurance but also, in-
directly, to certain relevant facts which 
were clearly admissible. On the other 
hand, the defendant contends that the dele-
tions were harmless. On the issue of 
whether it is proper to delete a reference to 
insurance from a pre-trial statement, writ-
ten or oral, or a contract, memorandum or 
other paper writing * * * , the cases 
and law writers tend to favor the deletion 
of the word on the giound of irrelevancy 
even though the exclusion might possibly 
distort slightly the meaning of the phrase in 
which it was used. A deletion is usually 
preferred in order to avoid the possible 
prejudicial effect the reference to insurance 
might have on a jury if the word was not 
deleted. See Jones v. Gilland, 1955, 137 
Cal.App.2d 486, 290 P.2d 329; Sapp v. Key, 
Mo.1956, 287 S.W.2d 775; Anderson v. En-
field, 1955, 244 Minn. 474, 70 N.W.2d 409; 
Capozi v. Hearst Publishing Co., 1952, 371 
Pa. 503, 92 A.2d 177; Derrick v. Rock, 
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Tmr v. Tourangeau, 1950, 116 V t 199, 71 A. 
2d 565; Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Mar-
vin, 1946, 313 Mich. 528, 21 N.W.2d 841; 
Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 1945, 219 Minn. 
541, 18 N.W.2d.582; Kuhn v. Kjose, 1933, 
216 Iowa 36f 248 N.W. 230; McCoimick, 
Evidence (1954) § 56; 7 Wigmore, Evi-
dence (3ded. 1940) § 2113(a). But compare 
Rodgers v. Ashley, 3 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d 
534; Fleischman v. City of Reading, 1957, 
388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 429; Vanni v. Clou-
tier, 1956, 100 N.H. 272, 124 A.2d 204; 
Guarnaccia v. Wiecenski, 1943, 130 Conn. 
20, 31 A.2d 464; and especially the Mary-
land cases of Rhinehart v. Lemmon, 1942, 
181 Md. 663, 29 A.2d 279, and Takoma Park 
Bank v. Abbott, 1941, 179 Md. 249, 19 A.2d 
169, which did not, however, involve the 
exact point now under consideration. 
In the Rhinehart case, supra, even though 
a "farm bureau" sign on an automobile seen 
at the scene of the accident carried a sug-
gestion of insurance, it was held that: 
"[Reference to [the sign] as a 
mark distinguishing the car would be 
relevant and unobjectionable. A sug-
gestion of the possession of insurance 
is not to be avoided at the cost of sup-
pressing evidence material to the es-
tablishment of the cause of accident 
and liability of the defendant sued for 
damages." 
[8] This Court has often recognized 
that when the reference to insurance is 
made by the defendant, he is in no position 
to move for a mistrial. International Com-
n n v v. Clark, 1925, 147 Md. 34, 127 A. 647; 
5 Md.L.Rev. 422 (1941). In the Ta-
Park Bank case, supra, an action 
«'£.niist a bank by the lessees of a safe de-
posit box for the loss of the contents of the 
box, the Court held that it was proper for 
the trial court to admit a statement made by 
the vice-president of the bank that the 
plaintiff had nothing to worry about since 
the bank was protected by insurance. At 
page 265 of 179 Md., at page 177 of 19 A.2d, 
we said: 
"It will be noted that the defendant 
itself, in mentioning insurance, first in-
jected it into the case. On no grounds 
recognized by reason or justice should 
it now be heard to complain because its 
statement went before the jury when 
in the first instance [defendant] sug-
gested it as an answer to the plaintiff's 
loss. * * * [Defendant], therefore, 
having injected insurance apparently 
as its reason and the only reason for 
the relaxation of due diligence in pro-
tecting the plaintiff's property is cer-
tainly not injured by this ruling." 
The Maryland cases previously referred 
to are not directly in point since the issue 
here is whether the defendant has a right 
to delete a reference to insurance before 
any mention of insurance is made at the 
trial. Those cases involved only situations 
where the defendant had already intro-
duced evidence of insurance and then 
sought a mistrial. However, it should not 
be overlooked that the Takoma Park Bank 
case, supra, is also authority to hold that 
the remark made by the priest relative to 
"not worrying about it" could be construed 
as an excuse for relaxation of care and dili-
gence, and therefore relevant to the issues 
in the instant case. At page 265 of 179 
Md., at page 177 of 19 A.2d we also said: 
"It cannot be said that the statement 
made by the executive vice-president in 
answer to appellee's charges of the 
bank's neglect in failing to protect his 
property would not to some extent be 
relevant as indicating to reasonable 
minds an excuse on the bank's part for 
a relaxation of care, diligence and re-
sponsibility, because undoubtedly it 
was relevant to the very issue in the 
case." 
See also Olson v. Sharpe, 1953, 36 Tenn. 
App. 557, 259 S.W.2d 867, in which it was 
held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting the plaintiff to in-
troduce a certificate of indemnity insurance 
for the purpose of showing the existence of 
a master-servant relationship, which was 
one of the issues in the case. The state-
ment in McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 168, 
is also pertinent: 
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"[E]vidence of the fact of * * * 
insurance is inadmissible unless it falls 
within some one of a group of excep-
tional situations. In these situations 
presumably the trial judge's discretion-
ary power to exclude could still be in-
voked if he should consider that the 
need for and value of the evidence 
were outweighed by its likelihood of 
misuse by the jury. What are those 
exceptions? 
"[T]he admission of a party bearing 
on negligence or damages may include 
a reference to the fact of insurance 
which cannot be severed without sub-
stantially lessening the evidential value 
of the admission." 
[9] In a case such as this—where the 
defendant desires to introduce a signed 
statement into the evidence, but without 
the reference therein to insurance, for the 
Purpose of impeaching a witness—and 
where the deletion of the phrase in which 
Jie reference appears materially changes, 
n one way or another, the meaning of what 
he witness has said in the statement as to 
Facts which are relevant and clearly admis-
sible, as the statement in this case does— 
ve hold that the defendant must elect be-
ween an introduction of the whole state-
nent without alteration or none of it. 
Adhere the deletion would produce a sub-
tantial alteration of the meaning of the 
>hrase in which the reference to insurance 
vas used, the exclusion should not be per-
nitted. 
(iv). Instructions as to Damages. 
[10] Strictly speaking, there was no as-
ignment of error in the instructions with 
espect to damages. After the original in-
truction to the jury had been made, the 
laintiff objected to two omissions in the 
harge by pointing out to the trial judge 
hat he had omitted any mention of the 
laintiff's "inability to do her household 
uties," and that the court had denied her 
any recovery for her crippled condition." 
'he judge by his amended charge instruct-
d the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to 
"fair and reasonable [sum] for the 
* * * loss of use of her hands in per-
sonal or household matters, h addition to 
the loss of earning power." On appeal the 
plaintiff contends that the court did not in-
clude in the amended instruction the omis-
sions from the original instruction except in 
the alternative. She insists that a proper 
instruction would have informed the jury 
that she was entitled to compensation for 
her crippled condition and disability, not 
only with respect to her earning power but 
also with respect to her ability to perform 
her household duties and other personal 
matters. Even if we assume that the plain-
tiff's contentions are correct, we are with-
out authority to consider the matter for the 
simple reason that she failed to object to 
the amended instruction pursuant to Mary-
land Rule 554, subd. d. We think it is 
clear that Rule 554 is as applicable to an 
amended instruction as it is to an original 
instruction, and that a party must fully 
comply with the requirements of the rule 
at every stage of the instructions in order 
to preserve his rights; otherwise there is 
nothing for us to consider on an appeal. 
[11-13] However, in this instance, since 
the case is to be retried, we think it is de-
sirable, if not necessary, for us to comment 
briefly on the instructions of the court with 
respect to damages. If the original and 
amended instructions are read together as 
we read them, we think it is clear that the 
charge as a whole contains a fair statement 
of the law with respect to damages in a 
case such as this. See West v. Belle Isle 
Cab Co., 1953, 203 Md. 244, 100 A.2d 17. 
The law on the subject was fairly covered 
by the instructions in the present case, and 
that is all the rule requires. We have re-
peatedly stressed the fact that we cannot 
put the "trial judge in a strait jacket, and 
prescribe or adopt a formula to be used and 
followed by him," with respect to his in-
structions to the jury. State, for Use of 
Taylor v. Barlly, 1958, 216 Md. 94, 140 A. 
2d 173, 176, and cases therein cited. We 
have also held that it is sufficient if the 
question or point of law involved is "fully 
and comprehensively covered" by the judge 
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in his instructions. Ager v. Baltimore 
Transit Co., 1957, 213 Md. 414, 132 A.2d 
469, 475. 
For the reasons assigned the judgment 
must be reversed, and the case remanded 
for a new trial. 
Judgment reversed and case remanded 
for a new trial, the appellee to pay the 
costs. 
HAMMOND, Judge (dissenting). 
I agree with the Court that the trial 
judge should have asked the jurors on voir 
dire substantially the questions that appel-
lant's counsel requested. I see no need to 
reverse, however, for prejudice was not 
shown and is not fairly inferable. The jur-
ors sitting on front benches, but a few feet 
from the clerk, hardly can fail to have 
heard the names of the parties when the 
case was called for trial a few minutes be-
fore Judge Niles asked the question he did 
as to possible prejudice as to a "religious 
corporation". Immediately after he asked 
it the jurors again heard the names of the 
parties, when they were sworn. No juror 
could have failed to know that the Roman 
Catholic Archbishop was the religious cor-
poration to which possible prejudice was to 
be related and no juror felt disqualified. 
The Court's decision on the use of the 
altered statement of the witness Moore 
seems to me wrong and unfortunate. I t is 
still the rufe in Maryland—whether or not 
it is a good or bad rule—that negligence 
cases are supposed to be tried and deter-
mined as if insurance were not involved— 
even negligence cases against charitable 
corporations. If the defendant brings out 
the fact that he is insured generally he may 
not call for a mistrial even though, in the 
words of this Court as to juries in Interna-
tional Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A. 
647, 650, "it seems to be natural and a 
weakness of human nature to allow the fact 
that the record defendant will not have to 
pay the judgment, to influence them in their 
verdict * * *." 
If the aim is to continue to be to keep 
from the jury whether or not the defend-
ant is insured, a defendant who desires to 
bring out the truth by use of a statement 
that contains a reference to insurance 
should be allowed to alter the statement 
even to the point of slight distortion of 
meaning, and use it. 
A fundamental and primary purpose of a 
law suit is to reveal the true facts. Be-
cause a law suit is an adversary contest is 
no reason to put difficulties in the way of 
this purpose by hampering a party who 
seeks to show facts favorable to him. The 
Court has erected such a road block by 
finding a distortion of meaning where none 
existed and thus requiring a defendant to 
elect between not using a paper calculated 
to draw out the truth and using it at the 
disadvantage of letting the jury know he is 
insured. 
Father Monmonier's reply to Mrs. 
Brown's statement that the floor was slip-
pery and she hoped the church's insurance 
was paid up—that she was not to worry 
about it,—could have meant any one or 
more of a number of things. It could have 
been intended, for example, to say politely, 
that the matter was none of Mrs. Brown's 
business, or to say that which ought to be 
done under the circumstances would be 
done. As altered the statement said the 
floor was slippery and Father said not to 
worry about it. The reply to Mrs. Brown's 
remark, as changed, meant just as much 
or just as little as the reply to her original 
remark. Certainly there was no substantial 
alteration of meaning, or even the slightest 
of distortions. 
It may well be that the rule as to the 
jury's knowledge of insurance should be 
changed. If so, it should be done directly 
by the Legislature. The Court should not, 
I feel, change it piecemeal by requiring 
a defendant to reveal the fact he is insured 
or lose the use of a weapon effective in 
bringing out the truth. 
By straining to find an altered meaning, 
where none existed, the Court has begun 
the change in the instant case, it seems to 
me. 
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